I came across this secret French army report into the use of carrier pigeons whilst researching communications during the Great War. The following is my attempt at translation. There is a link to the original document at the bottom of the page.
SECRET
USE OF CARRIER PIGEONS
RESULTS OBTAINED BY THIS METHOD OF COMMUNICATION
DURING THE BATTLES OF VERDUN AND OF THE SOMME.
LESSONS TO BE LEARNED.
Report no 743 S.R., drawn up on the 13th August 1916 by the army of Verdun concludes as follows :
Despite all the precautions taken, as a result of the formidable activity of the enemy artillery or of poor visibility, most means of maintaining close communication with combat units are insufficient and are often lacking at the most critical moments.
Experience has shown that –
- Telephone communications are always interrupted in the area of the attacks.
- Information sent by runners meets with major delays because of the state of the terrain and the violence of the barrages.
- Optical signals, obscured by smoke and dust, often remain inefficient.
- Aerial observation, is unfavourable in numerous circumstances due to bad weather or the remoteness of the objectives fails to inform the command of the progress of combat in a sufficiently precise manner.
Only carrier pigeons regularly function in all circumstances and, despite barrages, dust, smoke or fog, bring, in a relatively short period, precise information about the situation of engaged units.
Since the beginning of the battle of Verdun, communication by carrier pigeon has rendered inappreciable services ; it gets the vote of the high command and of the regimental officers and it cannot be sufficiently overstated that they should be in more widespread use.
The following examples, in recalling the employment of carrier pigeons in diverse conditions, will show that, even in the most critical moments, a unit which has been provided with carrier pigeons and which knows how to use them judiciously can remain in touch with the command and furnish it with all the information it needs to provide aid :
7th May, 09.15, a violent German attack launched along the front of the 28th Infantry division cut off all communications. Captain Michoux, commandant of the 2nd battalion, 99th reg. warned the command at 12.50 by carrier pigeon, which until then had been without news, allowing all appropriate measures to be taken.
During the course of the battles fought from 21st to the 25th of May ( Carrières, bois d’Haudromont, La Caillette, ferme Thiaumont, attack on Fort Douaumont ), the messages sent by carrier pigeon were still the only information that came from the front line. The Magnin battalion, of the 129th, in particular, which succeeded in penetrating Fort Douaumont, came by this method to make its situation known and was reinforced in good time.
1st June, in the German attack along the Thiaumont – Vaux front, it was carrier pigeons which allowed the battalion and regimental commandants to make their situations known and to ask for reinforcements and artillery support.
From the 2nd to the 5th of June the dramatic messages from commandant Raynal made it possible to follow, agonisingly, the magnificent efforts of the heroic garrison of Fort Vaux.
(More info about the defence of Fort Vaux can be found Here.)
9th June, most contradictory information was coming about the occupation of Thiaumont Farm. Captain Montarby was charged with going there on reconnaissance; he left with two pigeons. At 16.00 he arrived on the firing line to the northeast of the farm, he sent a message from this point. At 16.08 the pigeon arrived at the loft; at 16.10 the message was telephoned to HQ. Skirting the farm, captain Montarby arrived, at 16.10, on the firing line situated 500 metres to the southwest. He sent a second message. As rapid as its companion, the pigeon arrived at the loft at 16.18, at 16.20 HQ received the report. In twenty minutes, thanks to carrier pigeons, the command had established the situation with absolute clarity.
12th June, following an enemy attack on the front of the 410th Infantry regiment wounded men flooded into the Regimental Aid Post and there was no means of transport to the rear. Colonel Le Gouvello sent a message at 08.20. At 08.45 the divisional ambulance was contacted and sent stretcher bearers. This rapid intervention allowed many lives to be saved.
From the 21st to the 23rd of June the Germans made a particularly strong attack. All telephone communications were destroyed, three artillery barrages prevented runners from operating, optical communication, attempted in vain, cost the lives of an officer and three men. Lieutenant-Colonel Girardon commander of the 67th Infantry regiment, resorting to the pigeons, his messages reached command in a period of time from 20 to 25 minutes. The command signalled him by optics that his messages had been received and that help was coming. The 67th furiously resisted the most intense attacks up until the arrival of reinforcements. Meanwhile, the enemy was attempting to capture Froidterre. Captain Dartigues was only in contact with command by carrier pigeon. On the 23rd at 09.00 he signalled that the enemy was 500 metres away; at 10.00 he announced the encirclement of the fort, the destruction of the machine gun turrets, asked for a counterattack and affirmed that he would hold out to the last; at 11.00 a third pigeon was released informing that the situation was becoming more and more critical, but that the morale of everybody was excellent and that they would fight to the end. The command managed to send aid to these brave men; the fourth pigeon, released on the 24th by medical assistant Roux, announced that the fort had been reached but that it remained without communications. He urges sending many stretcher bearers and carrier pigeons during the following night.
11th July a new and powerful German effort from the rump of Froideterre to the village of Fleury; all telephone communications were cut, smoke making all optical communication impossible, 10 messages sent by carrier pigeon from different posts allowed the command to follow the stages of the fight.
12th July in the morning, the attack continues on Fort Souville. Some elements manage to penetrate the fortifications and are destroyed or taken prisoner. The Belleville observatory had signalled the arrival of the Germans in the fort and a grenade battle in its interior but it could not inform of the outcome of the fighting. 12 messages received by carrier pigeon outlined the situation to command, announcing that the German elements had been taken prisoner, specifying the positions of the respective forces, indicating threatened points and fixing the objectives of the artillery.
15th July a French counterattack is launched, 10 messages sent from hour to hour by the attacking units allowed developments to be followed.
1st August the Germans prepare a vigorous offensive in the region of Vaux-Chapitre and further east. [Message] Rockets are without effect; only the messages sent by carrier pigeon give the command the info they need to adjust artillery fire. The attack progressed in the Ravin des Fontaines and on the rump of la Haie Renard; the messages informed command of the threatened points and a sketch sent by colonel Breton clarified the respective emplacements. The command post of the regiment on the right, completely isolated at Carrières for part of the day could only communicate by carrier pigeon; the messages that it sent, came very quickly, allowing the reserves to advance and halt the advance of the enemy.
5th, 6th and 8th of August were marked by violent combat in the region Vaux-Chapitre, la Haie Renard. 45 messages from colonels Quirin and Gautez and from Lieutenant-Colonel Richaud clearly showed the diverse phases of the struggle and provided very clear suggestions to the command. Finally a sketch from Lieutenant-Colonel Richaud completed the clarification of the situation.
These examples chosen from situations where all other means of communication have failed show that the carrier pigeon, if it doesn’t always constitute the fastest means of communication, is incontestably the only one that can function at all times.
It is still too early to indicate, even in an incomplete way, the services rendered by carrier pigeons in the Battle of the Somme. The 6th and 10th armies have not yet been able to prepare documented reports which will allow it to be calculated.
However a large difference appears immediately between Verdun and the Somme:
At Verdun, carrier pigeons have, on their own, on many occasions replaced all other means of communication rendering services of inestimable importance to the command and front line troops. Because no-one can say what would have happened if these precious birds hadn’t lead the way in new lines of communication, escaping the fury of the Boche.
On the Somme their role has been more modest. Here we are the assailants: all the methods of communication have been planned, studied, prepared, our aircraft and artillery dominate those of the adversary. It is certain however that carrier pigeons will honourably take their place there; their performance is equal to that of the best means of communication ; their installation cost; their smaller space requirements; their operation is simpler. Carrier pigeons on the Somme constitute one part of a smoothly functioning whole.
A succinct report of the 6th army mentions that, on the 3rd of September, a message from the 7th army corps written at 14.00 arrived at 14.10 was telephoned at 14.12 allowed a reinforcement battalion that had been requested to help to be sent in good time.
The action of carrier pigeons during the day of the 20th September deserves to be particularly noted:
That day, the Germans made a forceful assault in the Bouchavesnes sector, held by the 127th infantry division. Telephone communications with the rear were cut, earth telegraphy sets were not functional, and communication by signals was impossible. What remained? The brave runners and eight small pigeons. The command said to the regiments: if all your communication systems break down, there remains to you these pigeons, trust in them. The 171st knew the pigeons well. It was they which allowed the command to get through the 24th of June, while exhausted by furious efforts, isolated by forward advances, decimated by enemy machine guns installed in Fort Vaux they clung on to the recaptured positions. But at Verdun, it had been given veteran pigeons, accustomed to gunfire for four months, knowing their profession, never having lived, and wanting only to live in their dovecote situated in the citadel. Here, what had it been given? Greenhorns of four months. Did they know the sector, these squabs which move around and don’t settle anywhere?
Colonels Garçon and Goureau were convinced, they believed it, and, trusting, they sent their messages by a sole pigeon, because they knew that they could not send their other birds before the end of the action. All arrived safe and sound. All arrived before the bravest runners: because whereas those are bound to the pitted ground and leap from shell hole to shell hole, they have the whole sky: in a few beats of the wing they escape the most dangerous area, they deliberately discard the direct line, the route is longer, but much surer!
Table 1.
These messages gave details about enemy preparations, troop concentrations, his attacks and successive setbacks; “about the capture of some elements that had reached as far as Bouchavesnes, clarifications which fixed the objectives of the artillery, indicating to the command the use of reserves” and rapidly informing it of the favourable outcome of this hard day.
The employment of carrier pigeons by the 10th army has given equally good results. The intelligent use by the 26th Infantry division of mobile pigeon loft assigned to it also deserves to be particularly noted.
From the 4th to the 8th of September this division sent 24 important messages, clearly indicating objectives that had been attained and the new positions of the various units, setting heavy artillery objectives, rectifying its fire when needed.
The message sent on the 8th of September by Colonel Le Rond allowed the army corps to determine the measures that he had taken with a supporting sketch and is a model of its kind.
All these messages have arrived in a period of time between 13 and 35 minutes.
General Micheler, commander of 10th army, in a note of the 9th of September to the army corps under his command, pointed out the remarkable results obtained in the course of operations the 26th Infantry division engaged in. He showed, by communicating the content of the messages, the time of flight and of transmission, the importance of the results we are entitled to expect from the properly understood use of carrier pigeons.
The Somme operations make it possible for us to appreciate the bravery of the mobile pigeon lofts.
At Verdun, communication by carrier pigeon has been assured by previously existing lofts. On the Somme, to the contrary, the fighting takes place in a region devoid of lofts in time of peace; communications have been assured by two fixed lofts, five trailers and six mobile lofts. The pigeon handling units of 6th army has been reinforced with a mobile loft coming from the Nieuport sector and another from Somme-Bonne; a third is on the way from the banks of the Moselle. The pigeon handling units of 10th army have been reinforced with a mobile loft coming from Reims.
The performance of these lofts is better than that of the two fixed lofts, despite the enforced travel: 140 km for the lofts from Reims and Nieuport, 200 km from Somme-Bonne; and almost 300 for that which set off from Domèvre-en-Haye.
These events show the degree of trust that we can place in the mobile pigeon lofts and the intelligent couriers that they contain.
We note that at Verdun as on the Somme where the replenishment of pigeons has been haphazard, almost all of the messages have been trusted to a single pigeon without great disadvantage. Building on this experience, we must not fear, each time we find ourselves in a critical situation and limited in carrier pigeons to trust a message to a single bird. But we must take care to save a copy of this message and to include it with that of the following bird; the message holders have been made large enough for this purpose.
![Pigeons_Voyageurs___le_tube_[...]Agence_de_btv1b9019149z_1](https://itsahistory.files.wordpress.com/2019/12/pigeons_voyageurs___le_tube_...agence_de_btv1b9019149z_1.jpeg?w=840)
We have seen how colonels Le Rond, Breton and Richaud and an artillery observer added a drawing to their report. We cannot recommend too highly to officers who have to use pigeons to add these drawings whenever they can. Because it is a gross error to believe that only the runner can carry this impatiently awaited drawing to high command, a simple examination of the message holder (and the pigeon can carry one on each leg) shows that the carrier pigeon can carry this much desired drawing. It will do it more rapidly than any runner.
In order to better appreciate the heroic loyalty of these winged liaison officers, it must be noted that, during the operations at Verdun and the Somme, several among them have returned to their lofts half eviscerated, others wounded in the head or the legs.
A certain number of carrier pigeons are kept with jealous care and surrounded in deep admiration :
Such are 183-14, 427-14 and 787-15 which had the honour of bringing commandant Raynal’s messages after having escaped the Boche who had already penetrated the ditches and were on the roof of Fort Vaux :
Table 2.
However it must be acknowledged that, despite all the recommendations and instructions given, the possible outcome is not always obtained everywhere. It is not sufficient that the carrier pigeon quickly accomplishes its mission, it is also essential that the corps or the division by which it is employed take the necessary provisions in advance to avoid any loss of time in the transmission of the messages. Some units in action on the Somme did not understand this in time.
In particular, it is essential that the NCO posted to the pigeon loft during active operations becomes very familiarised with the usage of the telephone, that he takes into account practical recommendations given to him by his army colleagues, and that he immediately report to his division any difficulties he encounters with the telephone transmission of messages.
In conclusion, some recommendations need to be made to all troops. Carrier pigeons must be fed very lightly in the trench stations ; they must be allowed to remain hungry so as to quickly return to the loft where food and treats await. The pigeon, in the trench, must be provided with the maximum of hygiene, but not of comfort ; it must be there in penitence ; it must ardently desire to quit this residence to return home and find the pleasures that await it. The trooper, in indulging the pigeons by distributing rice and small seeds, destroys the work of the specialist. At critical times, these pigeons could linger around the post, perhaps to be killed, instead of flying straight to their loft.
![Pigeons_voyageur_dans_leur_panier_[...]Agence_de_btv1b9030631r_1](https://itsahistory.files.wordpress.com/2019/12/pigeons_voyageur_dans_leur_panier_...agence_de_btv1b9030631r_1.jpeg?w=840)
In the same vein, it is expressly recommended that the birds are not released at the post to exercise them. It must be remembered :
1 – That the Germans in observing them may locate the post.
2 – That the pigeon, a lot more intelligent than we think, could develop the habit of returning there instead of going back to the loft, if it has been attacked by other aggressive pigeons and chased from its box.
Original report (in French) can be found Here on the Gallica website.
It's a history... 